general relativity, then my theory will be dust and ashes. Feyerabend (1993, p, 42 footnote 12). Now, maybe I have been hanging out with the wrong crowd of theorists, but I challenge anyone to o¤er an equivalent quote from an eminent economic theorist indicating a similar awareness that theory is merely fancy speculation until supported by some evidence.
It is unclear how economic theory has been able to grow and ‡ourish with such limited respect for empirical validation. One possibility is that historically, economic theorists were philosophers whose theories were no more than speculations about human nature; when these speculations were eventually mathematized, the ethos of the …eld was already set in cement. Another possibility is that when economic theory was …rst created and later formalized in the 20th century, it was strongly believed that economics was not an experimental science, so seeking validation through experiments was pointless. Whatever the reason, theorists and experimentalists have historically had an uneasy relationship in economics, at least compared to that in the natural sciences. This is not to say that the theory-experiment relationship in the natural sciences is utopian; from what I have learned, for example, experimentalists tend to get all the funding while theorists get all the prestige.
In this paper I want to assess the relationship between economic theory and experiments. I want to provide some insight into the nature of that relationship, and what it should or must be given the opportunities and constraints we face as social scientists. While the history of this relationship is one of estrangement and resistance, the future looks di¤erent. That future will redound to the mutual bene…t of theorists and experimentalists, however, only if they recognize the limitations of testing social-scienti…c theories in the lab, and speci…cally the limits on the types of questions that experimentalists are capable of answering. To that end, I want to discuss …ve questions, all of which deal with the relationship between theory and experiment and the proper way to test theory in the lab. The questions asked are:
1. Why is theory needed for experimentation? 2. What is the di¤erence between predictive and explanatory theory? Is one more valuable than the other?
3. What does it mean to "test theory" in the lab?
4. What level of aggregation should we use to test theory?
5. What features of data present the proper test of the theory?
I o¤er neither perfect solutions nor great insights. What I am mostly aiming to do is to share my confusion about the relationship between economic theory and experiments and raise a number of issues that I …nd interesting and puzzling.
What is the Relationship Between Theory and
Experiments in Economics?
Strong and Wrong Theories: The Role of Theory in Experiments
Economics is known as the queen of the social sciences because of the rigor it brings to answering questions posed to it. What this rigor means is that economists look to understand the exact circumstances under which various statements are correct. For example, take the statement:
Statement 1: When the price of a good increases, demand falls.
This statement, while passing the test of common sense, is not a correct statement. Whether the demand for a good falls when the price increases depends on the relationship between the income and substitution e¤ect at the current price, i.e. whether the good is a Gi¤en good or not. So what economic theory does is provide the conditions under which Statement 1 is correct. More generally, economic theory is a search for the circumstances that must exist in order for a statement about economic or social beahvior to be logically correct. A successful theorist provides all the ifs that are necessary for the logical completion of if-then statements.
By this de…nition, economic theory has no connection to the real world. Theorists are focused on …nding the minimal conditions for statements to be logically correct, and whether those conditions are realistic or descriptive of the real world is a question that is rarely asked. To my mind, however, such theories are wrong by construction. It is just obvious a priori that deducing the minimal conditions for certain statements to be logically correct cannot result in accurate predictions of human behavior. In my view, all theory is wrong until tentatively validated.
So how can a science based on a wrong theory function? Why should theory be used to guide experiments? I argue in Schotter (2007) that while economic theory may be "wrong" by de…nition, it is also "strong" in the sense that its assumptions are transparent, which allows its predictions to be evaluated logically. It is also strong in the sense that it allows economists to make point and interval predictions about social situations that are not possible for other social sciences whose theories are not as formal and whose assumptions not as transparent I will now outline three examples of the usefulness of "strong and wrong" theories: The Ultimatum Game, Expected Utility Theory, and Quantal Response Equilibrium.
The Ultimatum Game
If one adheres to the premises of sel…shness and subgame perfection, then economic theory can predict what will happen in the Ultimatum Game. The Pro-poser will o¤er zero or epsilon to the Respondent, and the Respondent will accept. 1 No other social science can make these types of predictions. Economics is what I call a "strong" social science because its theories lend themselves to prediction. It is this strength of economic theory that sets it apart from our sister social sciences. In the case of the Ultimatum Game, though, economic theory's predictions are wrong. In my view, strong and wrong theories are useful because they lend structure to the scienti…c enterprise -speci…cally, through falsi…cation of old theories and construction of new and better ones.
The history of Ultimatum Game experiments demonstrates this point. Guth (1982), the Ultimatum Game's experimental pioneer, was interested in whether subjects were capable of performing backward induction as predicted by economic theory. While the subjects proved capable of backward induction, Guth discovered that Proposers nevertheless made positive o¤ers.
2 These "anomalies" -and without theory there are no anomalies -were generally thought to result from subjects' violation of either the sel…shness axiom or subgame perfection. More recently, the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) and Bolton-Ockenfels (2000) theories of inequity aversion have provided even better explanations for these anomalies. The economic theory of the Ultimatum Game was wrong, but its transparent assumptions allowed us to make predictions, which paved the way for systematic investigations of how and why it was wrong. 
Expected Utility theory
Expected Utility Theory also demonstrates the usefulness of a strong and wrong theory. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) identi…ed a set of axioms that, if descriptive of the way people think, predicted that they would behave according to the precepts of Expected Utility Theory. Whether these axioms accurately described the world was an empirical question that could be investigated experimentally. Allais (1953) , Ellsberg (1961) , and others showed that some of the axioms of the theory, most notably the Independence Axiom, did not accurately describe how humans make decisions. Research into these anomalies led to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory and a host of other new alternatives to Expected Utility Theory. Without Expected Utility Theory functioning as a straw man, Prospect Theory and other non-expected-utility theories would not have been developed. It is precisely because Expected Utility 1 See Levine (in this volume) for a discussion of these assumptions. See also Schotter and Sopher (2007) for a discussion of how non-subgame-perfect equilibria with positive amounts o¤ered by the Proposer may be selected as solutions to the Ultimatum game. 2 The original Guth study showed that subjects were fully capable of performing backward induction in a more complex game, suggesting that they knew the subgame perfect equilibrium in the Ultimatum Game but rejected it based on other factors. 3 It is not enough to claim ex post that experimentalists have misinterpreted a theory, or else that if one allows for other preference assumptions or other solution concepts, the theory is resurrected. The theorist must determine the predictions of his theory before the experimental test, and not after the data has arrived. While we now can look at Ultimatum Game data and accuse the originators of naivete, I think that they were testing the predictions of the prevailing theories at the time the experiment was run.
Theory was wrong or at least was capable of being violated and these violations proved to be informative in interesting ways. .
Quantal Response Theory
Another example of a wrong theory leading to improved theorizing is the case of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which was designed to remedy the inaccuracies of Nash theory's comparative-static and point predictions. Here, the Nash theory failed to account for the fact that subjects don't behave in accordance with best-response theory; humans make decisions stochastically, with noise, and they take into account the relative payo¤s of decisions relative to other available decisions. QRE accounts for these decision elements, and it results in better qualitative and quantitative predictions. As with the Ultimatum Game and Expected Utility Theory, QRE would likely not have been constructed except for the existence of Nash theory's systematically false predictions.
To summarize, what I have said above should be taken as a justi…cation for theory-led experiments. In my experience, the most e¤ective way to structure experimental research in the social sciences is to use theory as a benchmark (straw man, if you prefer) for the judgment of experimental data. Analysis of deviations from the theory's predictions can help sort out what assumptions are violated. On this view, rather than providing valid explanations of the world, theories codify logically consistent and intelligible assumptions that produce testable predictions. While I certainly root for my own theories and perhaps those of my close friends in the lab, I am equally happy to …nd interesting deviations as I am con…rmation. Testing a theory is valuable because it can demonstrate how the theory fails while generating inferences about what elements of human behavior were missing from the theory. Indeed, I would submit that economics has made more progress by analyzing the failures of theory rather than successes.
3 What is the di¤erence between predictive and explanatory theory? Is one more valuable than the other?
What should we expect from good theories? According to Milton Friedman, we should expect them to make good predictions:
The ultimate goal of a positive science is the development of a "theory" or "hypothesis" that yields valid and meaningful (i.e. not truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet observed (Friedman 1953 , p.7).
Friedman emphasizes that our theories should generate ex ante predictions of events "not yet observed" rather than ex post rationalizations of previously observed phenomena. By "not yet observed", Friedman does not mean events strictly in the future, however: "[P]redictions" by which the validity of a hypothesis is tested need not be about phenomena that have not yet occurred, that is, need not be forecasts of future events, they may be about phenomena that have occurred but observations on which have yet to be made or are not known to the person making the prediction. (Friedman 1953, p.7) In other words, Friedman's predictiveness also includes "postdictiveness", inasmuch as the past observations consist of untested data.
Because predictiveness is paramount, Friedman asserts that the empirical realism of a theory's assumptions is not a basis for critical evaluation. I reject that view by the following reasoning. Consider Statement X, which follows from assumptions a, b, and c. If Statement X predicts well when tested using real world data, yet any of the assumptions are wrong, then the theory faces one of three problems: 1) one or more assumptions is super ‡uous, 2) two or more assumptions counteract each other in a way that is consistent with the data, or 3) the consistency of the data with the theory is altogether spurious. Conversely, if all the assumptions of a model are correct and the model is complete, then the predictions of the theory must be corroborated. It is di¢ cult, therefore, to see how the assumptions of a model are unimportant --after all, the assumptions are the theory.
Many people have argued, and I think rightly, that the theoretical exercise advocated by Friedman is not the only one we can engage in. We are often presented with data that contradicts our intuitions or our theoretical presuppositions; these data require explanation, which requires the construction of new theory. While the value of such explanatory theory is evident, Friedman distinctly places it below predictive theory. I think it more accurate to say that experimentalists face a trade-o¤ between prediction and explanation. That is, one must …nd a balance between 1) theories that make precise predictions but may not be able to explain data e¤ectively ex post, and 2) theories that make weak predictions yet can explain data e¤ectively ex post.
Examples of Predictive and Explanatory Theories:
3.1.1 Nash vs. Quantal Response Let me explore this di¤erence in more detail. Take the di¤erence between the Nash theory and the Quantal Response Theory as it is applied to a simple 2 x 2 game. Consider the game used by Goeree and Holt (2002) , where they have people play two di¤erent 2x2 games presented to them as follows: (2002) call a "treasure", a situation where the theory predicts behavior well. Note that for Game 1 payo¤s, QRE predicts the same result as Nash, i.e., that both players will choose their rows or columns with equal probability no matter what their ability to best respond is, i.e., for any value of . For Game 1 payo¤s, the theories agree and both make precise, unequivocal predictions. Now consider Game 2, which is identical to Game 1 except for a change in the payo¤ to the row player in the upper left hand cell. The row player will use the same 50-50 mixed strategy, while the column player will now choose Left 10% of the time and Right 90% of the time. As the percentages indicate, though, this prediction is wrong. Goeree and Holt (2002) found that row players choose Top 96% of the time and Bottom 4% of the time, while the column player chooses Left 16% of the time and Right 84% of the time. Nash theory's precise point prediction was wrong.
In contrast to Nash, QRE does not make a precise point prediction for Game 2. To make such a prediction, QRE needs to know what values of describe the players'behavior. In other words, QRE is primarily an explanatory theory. It can explain data ex post but cannot make precise predictions ex ante unless one commits to a speci…c value for : Fitting the theory to the data ex post di¤ers from having the theory make a prediction ex ante --what Friedman urges us to do.
In one sense, QRE is predictive, however, in that it can be used to make qualitative predictions about the comparative statics of models. For example, in Goeree and Holt's game, QRE's comparative-static predictions di¤er significantly from the Nash theory's (when comparing Games 1 and 2). In Game 2 (relative to Game 1), QRE predicts that the row player will increase his use of Top while the Column planer will increase his use of Right. Moreover, QRE makes this prediction robustly; no matter what is assumed, QRE correctly predicts the direction of change in behavior between Game 1 and Game 2. Nash theory, meanwhile, predicts no change in behavior for the row player. In this circumstance, then, QRE generates a more accurate (albeit less precise) prediction than Nash theory.
Level-k Theory
Predictive theories make predictions before experimental data is collected, while explanatory theories can only be de…ned after data has been collected. One good place to examine this di¤erence is level-k theory (Stahl, 1995; Camerer, 2004 ; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, & Broseta, 2001). Crawford and Iriberri (2007) attempt to explain the systematic deviations from unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in zero-sum two-person "hide-and-seek"games with non-neutral framing of locations. Exemplary of such a game is that run by Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller ("RTH") (1993, 1996, , which instructed the seekers thusly:
Your opponent has hidden a prize in one of four boxes arranged in a row. The boxes are marked as shown below: A, B, A, A. Your goal is, of course, to …nd the prize. His goal is that you will not …nd it. You are allowed to open only one box. Which box are you going to open?
Common sense advises the hider to put the money in the box that was "least likely". But if the players agreed as to which box was the least likely, then it would become the most likely and would therefore be a silly place to hide the money. By intuition, one notices that the "B"location is distinguished by its label and hence focal, whereas the two "end A" locations may also be inherently focal. These intuitions also give the "central A" location its own brand of uniqueness as the "least salient" location. While the Nash theory predicts that the money will be put in any box with a probability of 0.25, in experiments the hiders put the money in the "least salient" box, "central A", 37% of the time, while seekers look there 46% of the time.
Crawford and Iriberri (2007) try to resolve the following two stylized puzzles: 1) Why do hiders allow seekers to …nd them 32% of the time when they could hold it down to 25% via the equilibrium mixed strategy?
2) Why do seekers choose central A even more often than hiders? Success in the hide-and-seek game requires that one out-guess his/her opponent. Explaining hide-and-seek decision-making is therefore a matter of level-k analysis. Making this analysis more complicated and interesting are the asymmetric labeling of choices and the "least-salient" appearance of "central A".
One should note that without data, we cannot even begin to model this situation using a level-k analysis. The key to level-k modeling is the construction of what a level-0 player is likely to do. This construction can only be performed after we have the data we are trying to explain since no theory of level-0 agents exists that predicts this behavior. Crawford and Iriberri (2007) perform this level-0 construction by working from two assumptions. First, they assume that no subjects behave as level-0 types. Anchoring of the level-0 type exists only in the minds of higher-level types as the starting point for their strategic thinking. Second, they assume that the level-0 types for hiders and seekers are identical, i.e., they both use identical mixed strategies over the four locations, and their mixed strategies favor salient locations. Formally, level-0 hiders and seekers are assumed to choose A, B, A, A with probabilities p/2, q, 1-p -q, p/2 respectively, with p > , and p + q 1. Because the "end A" frequencies are almost equal in the data, Crawford and Iriberri set equal their choice probabilities for level-0 (and higher) types, for simplicity.
Note, however, that these assumptions are made only after the authors know the stylized facts they are trying to explain, i.e., only after they have seen the data. Just as QRE needs data to de…ne , level-k theory needs data to de…ne what level-0 types do. Like QRE, level-k is an explanatory theory because, given the model's parameters, it cannot be speci…ed until the data it is being …t to is provided. Notwithstanding their weak predictiveness, such exercises are valuable. Crawford and Iriberri's analysis provides an elegant application of level-k theory to a puzzling problem. It is not, however, the type of predictive analysis that Friedman had in mind.
Making Explanatory Theories Predictive
The gap between explanatory and predictive theory is not as wide as the above discussion suggests. Many explanatory theories can use models estimated for previous data sets to make predictions out of sample on other data sets. Crawford and Iriberri, for example, estimate their level-k theory separately for each of RTH's six treatments and use the re-estimated models to "predict"the choice frequencies of the other treatments with a fair amount of success.
More ambitiously, Crawford and Iriberri also test their model's predictive power for data generated by other experiments run independently. They consider two similar experiments, O'Neill's (1987) card-matching game and Rapoport and Boebel's (1992) closely related game. These games both raise the same kinds of strategic issues as RTH's games, but with more complex patterns of wins and losses, di¤erent framing, and in the latter case …ve locations. Using the model estimated from RTH's data, Crawford and Iriberri "predict" subjects' initial responses in these games. Similar exercises are performed by Ho, Wang and Camerer (2008), when they predict their EWA learning model out of sample to demonstrate that they have not over-…t their model to the data.
To summarize, in our everyday lives as a scientists we are faced with two types of theories, those that are predictive and those that are explanatory. While I am not placing one above the other, I do think that it is important to know which type of theory we are working with and not to confuse ex ante prediction with ex post explanation. Theories that explain well may fail to make tight predictions, while those that make precise predictions may explain data poorly. Friedman would urge us to focus on predictive theories, but that does not mean that explanatory theories are useless. As I have argued and will argue later, if explanatory theories like QRE can be used to make valid comparative-static predictions, then these predictions may be as good as we can expect from social-scienti…c theories. I have also made the case, however, that predictive theories with poor track records can be useful in that they structure our thinking and provide fodder for later explanatory theories. As we have seen, the failures of the Nash theory led to QRE, just as the failures of Expected Utility Theory lead to Prospect Theory and other theories of decision-making under uncertainty. That is the value of being strong and wrong.
4 What does testing a theory in the lab mean?
I have not argued for a refutation of theory; on the contrary, theory is essential. The real question is how we should test our theories or models, not whether models are useful or not. There are two basic approaches to theory-led experimental design and analysis; I call them the structural approach and the comparative-static approach. In this section, I examine these two approaches.
Let us, for the moment, restrict our attention to predictive theories and ask two questions: 1) What is it about the theory that we expect to be testable in the lab? and 2) how should we go about testing it? The structural approach takes a model to the lab in an unaltered state and uses experimental data to estimate the model's parameters by a maximum-likelihood or other goodnessof-…t criterion. The comparative-static approach places less demand on the model and attempts to verify whether, given the parameter values induced in the lab, the predictions of the theory are substantiated. In the strong form of the comparative-static approach, we expect the point predictions of the theory and its comparative statics to be substantiated while, in the weaker form, we expect only the qualitative directional predictions to be supported. A third "quasi-structural" approach assumes a heterogeneous population of behavioral types and uses data to estimate a model of distribution over types. Because the quasi-structural modeler has complete freedom to de…ne the types (including junk categories that soak up all behavior), such models tend to be more ad hoc I therefore direct my attention in this section to the structural and comparativestatic approaches.
The Structural Approach
The structural approach in laboratory experiments borrows directly from the structural approach taken by applied econometricians using …eld data. Structural theorists often fail, though, to make the proper modi…cations for the special circumstances existing in the lab. As mentioned, in the structural appraoch the model is sacrosanct and should be applied to data un…ltered. Experiments are used not to challenge the model's axioms, but rather to estimate the model's parameters. These parameter values are meaningful in and of themselves and may be exported out of sample to other similar situations.
As shown in Section 2.1 above, this approach is fundamentally ‡awed. If a theory is false by construction, it makes no sense to use it as a maintained hypothesis for empirical analysis. In my view, theories should have some empirical validation before we go about calibrating or estimating their parameters. The structural approach, in contrast, just assumes as a null hypothesis that the theory is correct and only uses empirical data to estimate the theory's parameters. By de…nition, then, the structural approach cannot test theory.
To my knowledge, none of the natural sciences use theory in this manner. For other sciences, the theory generates hypotheses (predictions) for testing, not for sancti…cation and estimation of parameters. Bringing presumptively false models to data under the maintained hypothesis that they are true is a questionable if not useless exercise. However, structural modeling of explanatory theories is a di¤erent matter, and if one assumes the fruitfulness of goodnessof-…t measures, they may be useful (see below).
As discussed in Schotter (2008) , the main curse we face as economists is that the real world is not arranged so that we can observe the types of variables we'd like to. For example, beliefs are important in many economic theories, yet they are unobservable. Other unobservables include costs, reservation wages of unemployed workers, etc. These are things we'd love to be able to measure directly but cannot. The great accomplishment of applied econometrics has been its ability to identify and measure such unobservables through statistical inference. When making inferences, a structural approach brings a theoretical equlibrium apparatus to bear for the analysis of real-world data rather than a partial reduced-form set of equations. This is a "strong and wrong" approach that makes perfect sense given the constraints on the data.
In the lab, however, we are capable of measuring and controlling many of the variables that are unobservable in the real world. Doing experiments therefore allows us to cut down dramatically on inference, and in some lucky cases, we can even avoid it altogether by a design that makes all relevant variables directly observable. Such designs normally involve clever treatments that isolate the variables of interest. The upshot is that experimentalists should ask themselves why they would import techniques designed for a world of information scarcity when the entire raison d'etre of the lab is the ability to control and measure what in the real world would be unobservable. Why infer when one can observe?
The Comparative-Static Approach
In the comparative-static approach, a theory's predictions are put to the test. The model's comparative-static properties are tested and explored using controlled treatments. Here there is little attempt to estimate the parameters of the model since they are induced in the design. Instead, great attention is paid to the quantitative and qualitative predictions of the theory. The point predictions of the theory are certainly tested, but experiments are primarily designed to perform the weaker test of whether subject behavior responds in the direction predicted by the theory to changes in the model's parameters.
In my view, the comparative-static approach makes more sense than the structural approach. I am also con…dent that, for the foreseeable future, it will be more productive scienti…cally. Given the constraints that we face as social scientists, the comparative-static approach is just about as far as we can go in testing theory. Searching for parameter values that are supposed to be meaningful outside the very narrow con…nes of a particular experiment is an exercise whose value needs to be thought out carefully .
A Formalization of the Di¤erence

4
As stated above, one of the problems with the structural approach as practiced by experimentalists is a lack of appreciation for the ability of the lab to allow the investigator to control variables directly. This control obviates the complicated inference strategies necessary when working with …eld data. Let us contrast the way an econometrician and an experimentalist look at their scienti…c tasks.
Let v be a vector characterizing an economic agent's (experimental subject's) environment. Elements of v can include probability distributions de…ned over prices, incomes, etc. Assume that v is a subset of the space V . The agent possesses an objective function, information set, computational ability, etc. that de…nes a behavior which is a function of the environment v. We denote the dependence by the mapping b : V ! B, where B is the space of behaviors.
The pair fb; vg map into an outcome y, which may itself be stochastic. Then let : B V ! Y . This y may be a variable of direct interest to the agent, such as a payo¤, or something of indirect interest. It must only be a function of b and v.
The structural econometrician typically only has access to data with values of y. To uncover v in this case, structural analyses take the following route. By assuming a set of objectives and information sets for the agent(s), and assuming unlimited computational ability on the part of the agent(s), an optimal rule may be solved for by the analyst. Assume that such a rule, parametric with respect to v, exists for all v 2 V , and denote this rule by b (v; ), where denotes parameters characterizing preferences, information sets, and/or the computational ability of the agent.
De…ne a distance function D(m; n) which has standard properties. Then the econometrician estimates = ( ; v) as follows:
where denotes the parameter space for .Estimation of allows the econometrician to perform comparative-static exercises conditional on the rule b .
The experimental approach typically focuses directly on the agent's behavior. Outcome measures (the y discussed above) may have little role to play in an experimental analysis. Instead, the experimentalist can more-or-less directly measure behavior as he or she varies the environment. Moreover, the experimentalist, through careful experimental design, can induce a certain set of preferences on the subject as well as directly control the subject's information set and computational resources (that is, all elements of ). Let us imagine that is then perfectly controlled by the experimentalist. The experiment may then proceed by varying v and measuring the behavior of the subject(s) directly. Imagine an experiment in which is always …xed at value 0 and where v 2 fv 1 ; :::; v N g: Each trial, characterized by a di¤erent v, is associated with an observed behavior b i , i = 1; :::; N . Oftentimes the purpose of experimental analysis is to determine the concordance between the predictions of received theory regarding optimal behavior under 0 and what is actually observed. Let S denote a distance function. Then the predictions of the theory are consistent with observed behavior if
is "small". These distinctions have signi…cance for experimental design. If the objective of the structural approach is to estimate from observations on y, for example, then that exercise would call for a design where the experimenter generates as many environments v as possible to provide enough variance in the righthand variables for e¢ cient estimation of : This design recommends very few observations of behavior b at many di¤erent values of v. The best way to do this is to generate the v's to be used in the experiment randomly.
Adherents of the comparative-static approach would proceed di¤erently. Under the null hypothesis that the theory is correct, they would choose a few v's in V where the predicted behavior of subjects is quite di¤erent and then generate many observations at those particular pre-chosen v's. The downside of this design is that, as stated above, we can only observe the predictiveness of the theory in a small subset of environments over which it is de…ned.
So as we see from this characterization, importing a structural econometric approach to experimental data fails to take advantage of all of the bene…ts that experimental and laboratory control o¤ers the experimentalist. It shifts the focus of inference from y to under the maintained hypothesis that behavior is characterized by b . The experimentalist need not take this approach since he can verify directly if b is being followed and can replace inference with observation generally.
Reconciliation
The discussion up to this point has left unanswered the question of the proper relationship between the structural and comparative-static approaches. How can they both be used to help us better understand the world we live in? My formal approach implies that the lab is ideal for two enterprises: 1) testing theory, and 2) estimating, under controlled circumstances, the relationship b (v; ) for export outside the lab to supplement structural work in the …eld. I will illustrate this statement by way of two examples.
First, consider the work done on the structural estimation of auction models using …eld data. Such models require that one estimate the parameters of the bidders'cost distribution, which is unobservable. Assuming as a null hypothesis a strictly monotonic Nash bid function relating cost to bids, the econometrician can estimate the parameters of the bidders'cost distribution. If people systematically deviate from Nash behavior, however, then estimates made under the null are inaccurate.
The assumption that people bid according to a Nash bid function is a testable hypothesis, and laboratory experiments can therefore be of help in this circumstance. Experimentalists can save the econometricians the problem of working from a false assumption by testing the behavioral hypothesis on which the structural estimation of …eld data is based. If it passes the experimental test, then the econometrician can go ahead and follow the assumption in his/her …eld estimation. If experiments show, instead, that bidders systematically deviate from Nash behavior, then the econometrician will know that following the assumption in his/her …eld estimation would lead to faulty results. Instead, he/she will have to seek a more accurate behavioral assumption, perhaps by constructing a bid function from the laboratory data to be used in his identi…cation exercise in the …eld. (See Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005) for a nice example of a paper that investugates this question). To account for worries about external validity, one can perform the experiment on bidding professionals using large stakes. 5 Another example of this method is found in Brown, Flinn, and Schotter (2009) (BFS). BFS perform a real-time search experiment in which the objects of interest are the subjects' reservation wages and their time path as search costs accumulate in real time. Since these experiments are performed by replicating a stationary environment, the optimal reservation wage policy for the agent is constant over time. This element re ‡ects studies using …eld data like that performed in Flinn and Heckman (1982) , in which the authors used the constant reservation wage policy as a maintained hypothesis in the estimation of unobservable parameters of the search environment, e.g. the arrival rate of wages, the parameters of the distribution of wages generating o¤ers, etc. If there is time dependence in the reservation wage policy, however, then Flinn and Heckman's estimates would be biased. In that case, better estimates could be derived if one replaced the assumption of a constant reservation policy with a time-dependent reservation policy estimated in the lab.
While such a full re-estimation is not attempted by BFS, they do use lab results to estimate the shape of the hazard functions for exits out of unemployment in the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. What they …nd is that, inconsistent with …ndings derived from the constant-reservation-policy assumption, the hazard functions based on lab results exhibit both increasing and decreasing segments. Increasing hazards are inconsistent with a constant reservation wage policy for searchers in heterogeneous environments, so BFS's …ndings indicate time dependence for some agents.
This …nding would not have been possible without lab experiments because it is only in the lab that one could exert enough control over the environment facing job searchers to establish the their reservation wages are time dependent. The declining reservation wage observed in the lab should therefore be incorporated into future work using …eld data. In this and many other economic investigations, the lab is a place to test the assumptions upon which …eld work is based. Instead of assuming that bidders use a Nash bid function or that workers search using a …xed reservation wage, we should subject these assumptions to empirical test.
What can we learn from experiments?
Finally, one must ask what to expect to learn from an experimental paper. What is its output? Papers that take the comparative-static approach should test the workings of the theory. We can observe how a theory performs over a carefully selected set of points in the model's parameter space, and we can observe how behavior changes as we move across treatments (across the parameter space). The comparative-static exercise furnishes us with a natural metric by which to judge the performance of the theory. With a good experiment, one can often eyeball the data to see if the theory is doing well. If the theory fails, a good experiment will identify a set of problems with the theory that can lead to new insights and new theories.
A paper that takes the structural approach outputs a goodness-of-…t measure (a likelihood) that shows how close a model, assumed to be true, …ts the experimental data. The structural approach does not test the theory, since the truth of the theory is a maintained hypothesis, and it o¤ers no information about what the theory does not explain (Roberts and Pashler, 2000) . That is, theories are only useful if there are observations inconsistent with the theory; if the theory can explain any set of observations, it is vacuous.
A structural analysis results in a goodness-of-…t measure whose absolute value is di¢ cult to interpret without a benchmark comparison. In those papers that consider alternative models and likelihoods, the alternatives are rarely as well-crafted or thought-out as that which motivated the paper. They are usually thrown in as straw men for meaningless comparisons. Moreover, the structural approach assumes away what it calls "disequilibrium" behavior because it is impossible for such behavior to exist. In consequence, structural exercises rarely generate unexpected or salient results, since they are ruled out at the outset.
While this may sound critical it is only an obvious criticism of the structural approach to testing theory in the lab. The main focus of the structural approach in applied work using …eld data is the performance of policy thought experiments using equilibrium models with estimated parameters. IN other words, the main justi…cation for doing structural work has never been to test theory but rather to examine policy. Importing it into the lab, therefore, is misplaced.
Testing Theory
Once one has decided on a theory to take to the lab, a few questions arise. One concerns what level of aggregation you are going to use for your test, and the second involves what characteristics of the data you will want to explain. Let us discuss these one at a time.
What level of aggregation should we use to test theory?
Most microeconomic models brought to the lab are written on the level of the individual. They focus on the choice behavior of the individual agent, and theoretical predictions are made for that individual. What we observe in many experimental papers is that while the theory is one of individual maximization, the data used to test the theory is aggregated over time or across individuals. This approach is usually taken because individual behavior is erratic and heterogeneous, so some smoothing is needed in order to see patterns. Aggregation provides this smoothing. While this disconnect is often harmless, in some cases it gives a misleading account of subject behavior. Let me illustrate this point by reference to Mueller and Schotter (2009) , which concerns a test of a model by Moldovano and Sela (MS 2001) (henceforth M-S) about the proper design of tournaments or contests. M-S derive the "optimal"set of prizes for an organization trying to motivate workers through an e¤ort contest or tournament. They investigate …rms where workers are assumed to be risk-neutral expected-utility maximizers with either linear, convex or concave cost-of-e¤ort functions, and where an organizational designer has a limited amount of money available for bonuses to be awarded to those workers whose outputs are highest. (Assume that output is linear in e¤ort and non-stochastic; e¤ort is essentially equivalent to output, and both are observable). Workers di¤er according to their ability, which is randomly assigned from a distribution that is common knowledge.
M-S demonstrate that for organizations where workers have linear or concave cost-of-e¤ort functions, the optimal prize structure is one where the entire prize budget is allocated to one big prize, while if costs are convex, it might be optimal to distribute the budget amongst several prizes. 6 In M-S's theoretical contests, equilibrium e¤ort functions are continuous functions of the abilities of the workers. In the lab, though, individual e¤ort appears to follow a discontinuous step function in which low-ability workers drop out and exert zero or low e¤ort, while high-ability workers over-exert themselves. This trend leads to the bifurcation of e¤orts described above.
More relevant to the current inquiry, when Mueller and Schotter aggregate their data across individuals, e¤orts appear continuous. The observed bifurcation of e¤orts is obscured at the aggregate level. This is an example of aggregate results giving a distorted view of what is occurring at the individual level.
To see this more starkly, consider Figure 1 In the theory, a subject's e¤ort in any given period of the experiment should be a function of the (random) ability of the subject in that period. The solid line in each …gure represents the predictions of the theory, while each dot represents the mean e¤ort chosen for any given ability level realized by subjects in that treatment.
Note that the equilibrium e¤ort function of the theory is continuously decreasing in the ability of the subjects. Further, note that, on average, the data suggest that behavior is predicted by the theory. E¤ort levels appear to be continuous in ability and basically attracted to the theoretical bid function, with a few exceptions. So as far as we can see, this theory is supported by the data if we aggregate in this manner.
This aggregation masks substantial deviation of the behavior of individual subjects from the predictions of the theory, however. Consider Figure 2 , which represents a sample of individual bid functions taken from Mueller and Schotter.
In Figure 2 we see the dotted line representing the prediction of the theory while the dots again present the mean e¤ort of the given subject when receiving a given ability level. Note that these individual bid functions tell a very di¤er-ent story from the aggregate functions presented in Figure 1 . Here it is clear that subjects basically follow a step function in their bidding behavior. For high ability levels (represented by low numbers on the horizontal axis) i.e., ability levels below a critical threshold, subjects basically exert high e¤ort levels. For ability levels above the threshold, they drop out. This qualitative feature of individual behavior is obscured by aggregation, where a composition e¤ect makes the aggregate e¤ort function appear continuous.
Some people might claim that this discrepancy (between aggregate and individual behavior) is of no practical importance, since what is important for organization design is whether the behavior of the organization (its aggregate behavior) is consistent with the theory used for its design. A risk-neutral manager will only care about aggregate e¤ort and output and not how that output was achieved. This claim is misguided, however, for two reasons. First, the test performed by Mueller and Schotter did not investigate the comparative-static behavior of subjects over di¤erent contest parameters. While the theory would predict that behavior changes continuously over the space, it might be that certain con…gurations result in a disproportionate number of dropouts which would spoil the organizational atmosphere. Second, Mueller and Schotter used a design where subjects received a new random ability level each period, so that subjects who are low-ability contestants in one period may high-ability in the next. If ability had been constant over the entire experiment -a design that more closely resembles the real world, if not the assumptions of the theorythen low-ability subjects that drop out might do so permanently. This permanent dropout might cause high-ability subjects to also lower their e¤ort, leading to a potentially perpetual e¤ort cycle.
A similar situation characterizes the learning literature, where various models are posited as describing learning behavior of subjects on the individual level yet are tested by aggregating data across subjects and time. For example, Erev and Roth (1998) de…ne reinforcement models on the individual level yet aggregate over time in testing them, while Camerer and Ho's (1999) EWA model is also written on the individual level yet tested on the aggregate level. If such aggregation masks the same type of behavior as exists in the M-S experiment, then one would have to reevaluate the conclusions made there.
What features of data present the proper test of the theory?
This section will use learning models to illustrate how experimental data should and should not be used to test theories. Consider Figure 3 , taken from unpublished data of Nyarko and Schotter (2000) . In each …gure we have placed the round of the experiment on the horizontal axis and the probability with which the subjects chose the Red strategy on the vertical. X's mark the pure strategy chosen in any given round, while circles indicate the predictions of the EWA model for that round. Figures 3a-3d present the results for four subjects in the pure-strategy experiments where subjects could only use pure startegies. 7 What is striking about all of these diagrams is the failure of both the EWA and Reinforcement models to track the period-to-period movements of actions for individuals. Neither the EWA nor the Reinforcement models capture this movement. To the extent that they …t the data, these models do so by passing a relatively straight line through a gyrating time series in an e¤ort to minimize the errors in prediction being made. In contrast, the Stated-Belief model captures the qualitative movements of the data quite well. It predicts the abrupt changes seen in the data with a fair amount of precision because changes in actions in some sense mimic changes in beliefs, which are considerable.
From these …gures we can see that each theory must be judged on two criteria. The …rst is level calibration indicates how well the theory …ts the data using a standard goodness-of-…t measure, i.e., the Mean Squared Deviation. The second is change calibration which indicates how well the theory captures the qualitative features of the data -in this case, the …rst di¤erence of the time series. In most econometric exercises using laboratory data, authors restrict themselves to level calibration, judging models by their ability to match choice levels while ignoring their ability to predict changes from period to period. Ignoring change calibration leaves out a key qualitative feature of behavior; namely, behavioral volatility. Obviously, both features are relevant and need to be explained by any successful theory.
The data generated by these experiments o¤er observations on the time paths of chosen actions for subjects making choices over 60 rounds each. To compare the results of the three models mentioned above, Nyarko and Schotter (2000) constructed for each player and each theory two indices which describe how well the theory is calibrated to the levels and changes in the data. Our …rst measure is simply a mean MSD score calculated individual-by-individual in a particular experiment. In other words, the MSD score for individual i and model j, j = 1; 2; 3 is:
where N is the number of observations for individual i, p j pred (Red) is the predicted probability of Red being chosen by model j, and p act (Red) is the actual probability that Red was chosen.
This equation determines your standard calibration score measuring the data's goodness-of-…t. As Figures 3a-3d indicate, however, such a measurement fails to capture the movement in the data. A model may be well-calibrated in terms of levels but achieve its good …t by passing a relatively ‡at time series of predictions through a constantly moving time series of actions. To correct for this, we take the …rst di¤erence of both the actual choices made by our subjects and each theory's predictions. These …rst di¤erences record the actual periodby-period change in the choices of subjects and predictions made about these changes. Comparing these two time series indicates whether a model predicts changes in the behavior of subjects and not just levels.
Formally, let a it be the action chosen by subjects i in period t of the experiment he or she is engaged in. In the 2x2 experiments we are discussing, a it will denote the probability weight placed on the Red strategy. a it = a it a it 1 represents the change in the choice of subject i between period t and t 1. In the pure-strategy experiment studied here, a it can take the values f 1; 0; +1g: Similarly, let a pred(j) it denote the predicted probability weight placed on the Red strategy by learning model j, j = 1; 2; 3. represents the change in the predictions of model j about the actions of subject i between period t 1 and t.
To compare learning models on the basis of whether they can predict the changes in behavior observed in an accurate manner, we propose simply to use the MSD metric on this …rst di¤erence data as follows:
Hence, for any individual and any model, we have two goodness-of-…t measures, one measuring levels and one measuring changes in levels.
The results of these exercises are presented in Figures 4 and 5 below using data from Experiment 1 of Nyarko and Schotter (2002) . In that experiment, subjects were matched with the same partner for 60 periods. Their beliefs were elicited period by period, as well as their pure strategy choice chosen. The prediction of four models are presented: EWA, reinforcement learning, and three belief-learning models each using a di¤erent method of de…ning beliefs, including …ctitious play (FP), stated beliefs (BS), and a third method whose de…nition need not concern us here.
As we can see, the stated-belief model of Nyarko and Schotter …ts the data best in terms of level calibration. More importantly, it also …ts the data best when we take into account the …rst di¤erence in the data and therefore best characterizes the period-to-period changes in the behavior of subjects. This change calibration is important, in my view, because we should not consider a theory to have captured a data set if it passes a relatively smooth and unchanging time series through a data set replete with volatile period-to-period gyrations. The stated belief model picks up on these changes because the elicited belief series underlying the model is itself very volatile. When plugged into a stochastic choice model, it predicts volatility in actions. The EWA and Reinforcement models are relatively sluggish and simply try to minimize mean squared deviations in the data by tracing the mean. In summation, if we are to test theories with respect to their goodness-of…t, the question of what we are …tting the data to becomes relevant. While most theories are …t to the levels of the choice variables in the data set, doing so may obscure other important features of the data, such as their volatility. Moreover, the validation conferred on a theory by a likelihood measure might be misleading if it is achieved by …tting the theory to the data in a manner that does not capture the qualitative features of the data.
Conclusion
This paper has tried to answer some simple questions about the relationship between economic theory and experiments. It has argued that what makes economic theory useful as a guide to experiments is the structure that it provides for an examination of how people behave in economic situations. I have argued that one should proceed under the maintained hypothesis that theory is wrong, but hopefully wrong in interesting ways --i.e., in ways that lead to a fuller description of behavior than was allowed for in the axioms underlying the theory --ways that will lead to new and better theories. I have also investigated the distinction between predictive theories and explanatory ones, and pointed out that the original mission of economic theory, as spelled out by Friedman, was to generate predictive theories that are de…nable a priori, i.e., before the data of the experiment is generated, as opposed to explanatory theories that o¤er ex post explanations of data already generated. Finally, I have argued that given the constraints placed on social-scienti…c theory, it is probably best not to expect the lab to be able to do more than test the predictions of a theory and its comparative-static (qualitative) predictions.
One thing remains clear, however: Experimentation in economics is …rmly established. It has provided the profession with a tool for testing theory without the need for heavy inference of the type done in …eld work. The beauty of experiments is that they allow an investigator to control what he/she needs to control and observe what he/she needs to observe, which allows for simplicity in the testing of models. The complicated identi…cation strategies needed in …eld work can be replaced with the judicious use of experimental treatments that cleverly isolate variables of interest.
